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Misallocation of resources in an economy makes firms less productive. I document
the roles of heterogeneity, sorting, and complementarity in a framework where work-
ers, managers, and firms interact to shape productivity. The approach I follow uses
the movement of workers and managers across firms to identify the distribution of
productivity. I webscraped novel microdata of crime reports from the Indian police
department and combined them with the worker-level measurement of productivity.
Using this data I show that the third source of heterogeneity in the form of man-
ager ability is an important driver of differences in firm productivity. I empirically
identify complementarities between workers, managers, and firms using my estimation
methodology. Counterfactual results show that reallocating workers by applying a pos-
itive assortative sorting rule can increase police department productivity by 10%.
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1 Introduction
A central question in economics is what makes some firms more productive than others.
Past literature has shown that misallocation of factors of production can account for pro-
ductivity differences across firms. Therefore, the aggregate productivity of the economy can
be increased by reallocating the resources across firms (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009). Misallocation studies have identified underlying sources of misalloca-
tion such as regulation, market imperfections, and even government corruption (Restuccia
and Rogerson, 2017). However the studies often assumes homogeneous production function
across firms, and so the importance of effects of heterogeneity in firms and workers for aggre-
gate productivity remains unanswered. Worker and firm heterogeneity can shape the wage
and productivity distribution (Bonhomme et al., 2019; Abowd et al., 1999), and uncovering
heterogeneity can reveal the importance of sorting and complementarities for workers and
firms. Another significant branch of literature (Lazear et al., 2015; Bloom and Van Reenen,
2007; Bloom et al., 2013) shows that managerial quality may partly explain the productivity
gap across firms. In an economy, workers, managers, and firms interact simultaneously, so
attempts to explain the productivity gap through two-sided heterogeneity between workers
and firms or between managers and firms is inconclusive.
In this paper, I estimate the role of heterogeneity of workers, managers, and firms in police
productivity. Most importantly, I document the complementarities and patterns of sorting
among workers, managers, and firms. The empirical analysis relies on the quality and extent
of the data I use. I webscrape novel crime reports data 1 from the Indian police department to
create a matched database of employment histories of both workers (officers) and managers
(station head officers). This data allows me to track the job movements of workers and
managers across police stations. In a separate web scraping exercise, I match the outcomes
of the half-million crime cases to construct a measure of productivity. I use the time taken
to submit the final report or charge sheet in criminal cases as a productivity measure. Then,
1Half a million crime reports were web scraped for the Indian police department
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I use an employee-manager-firm data set linked to this productivity measure to identify how
workers and managers working across police stations contribute to productivity.
To empirically estimate workers’, managers’, and police stations’ contributions to police
department productivity, I model the production function without any parametric assump-
tions. I extend the standard model of Abowd et al. (1999, 2002) (henceforth AKM) and
Bonhomme et al. (2019) where only workers and firms contribute to productivity by adding
a third source of heterogeneity in the form of manager ability. Thus, my approach adds
managers and the interaction among workers, managers, and establishments to the extant
model. Therefore, in this paper’s three-sided model of productivity, heterogeneity comes
from workers (investigation officer), managers (station head officer), and firms (police sta-
tion).
I also model the complementarities between workers, managers, and firms as unrestricted
rather than additive, as described in the fixed-effects literature (AKM models). I assume
that heterogeneity in the economy can be represented by discrete types of workers, managers,
and firms. The identification of the individual contribution of workers and managers is a
challenging problem even with microdata. However, since I have employee-manager-firm
matched data, I use workers’ job mobility and manager types across police stations to infer
individual contributions. I represent the job transition of workers and managers using a
first-order Markov chain process. The model is estimated using a two-step approach where,
in the first step, I map managers and police stations to discrete classes representing quality.
The first step is a dimension reduction technique, and I use the classification algorithm
of k-means clustering to map the individual managers and firms to discrete types. The
second step uses the estimated manager and firm classes from the first step as input to
estimate the individual effect of workers, managers, and firms. The second step estimates the
model parameters using a finite mixture model, where a specific distribution of productivity
is realised based on workers moving between manager and firm classes in a short panel.
Using a grid computation technique, I estimate the model using the conditional Expectation-
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Maximixation (EM) algorithm to converge to the solution (Meng and Rubin, 1993).
The estimation methodology adopted in the paper has numerous advantages. Firstly,
the literature on managerial quality frequently uses the fixed-effects model popularised by
Abowd et al. (1999) and finds that the best managers are allocated to the least productive
workplaces or i.e. there is negative assortative matching of managers with firms. Due to this,
evidence on the presence of complementarity are inconclusive as Becker (1973) shows that
sign of sorting should be positive if complementarities are present and more recently Shimer
and Smith (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) emphasise the importance of sorting
of workers in the efficient production of output . Thus, the AKM model is restrictive and
often gives results that are not reconcilable with theoretical models. In addition to the above
issue, results obtained from the additive model of worker, manager, and firm productivity
can produce erroneous results in the counterfactual analysis when the researcher aims to
determine which sorting pattern of workers can maximise the aggregate productivity. In this
study, I keep the interaction unrestricted in a three-sided model of workers, managers, and
firms. So, I can estimate the match-specific contribution or the complementarities arising
from the worker, manager, and firm heterogeneity on the productivity gap.
Secondly, the model’s assumption of finite classes of managers and police stations reduces
the problem of limited mobility bias. In the AKM class of models, the correlations between
the worker and firm effects are negatively biased due to a small number of workers moving
across individual managers and police stations (Andrews et al., 2008). Rather than consid-
ering the job moves of individual workers across managers and firms, I map the managers
and firms to a small number of classes. Hence, the number of job movers across manager
and police station classes is large enough, and this dimension reduction technique solves the
problem of limited mobility bias. The manager and police station classes are the inputs
in the second step of the estimation, where I recover the model parameters leveraging job
mobility as the source of identification.
Thirdly, using the structural estimates of the model, I empirically identify the heterogene-
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ity and the degree of complementarities between the workers, managers, and firms. After
structurally modelling the interaction among workers, managers, and firms in the produc-
tion function, whether total productivity in the economy can be increased by reallocating
the workers can be answered. This is possible if worker-manager-firm match specific com-
plementarities enable gains from matching different types of workers with different types
of managers and firms. For example, reallocating a low-productivity worker to a better
manager would produce a larger increase in productivity than moving a high-productivity
worker to a lower quality manager. I then use these estimates in the second part of the
paper, where I perform counterfactual simulations by varying the sorting patterns between
workers and manager-police station types. I use these simulations to find the sorting pattern
that generates the police department’s maximum aggregate productivity.
I do these simulated experiments by using the estimated productivity distributions of
workers and the worker-manager-firm complementarities obtained by estimating the three-
sided model.In other words, I answer the question; do we increase the police department’s
aggregate productivity by reallocating workers across police stations?
Measurement of productivity in government-controlled public services is a well-known
issue in the literature (Ostrom, 1973; Cook, 1979; Mastrobuoni, 2020) because the govern-
ment does not maximise profits. Due to the difficulty in productivity measurement, the
productivity of public services is not documented extensively like it is for the private sector.
This gap in research becomes prominent in the case of performance measurement of public
services like police departments due to the lack of data in developing countries. Apart from
measuring productivity, there is limited research that shows that managers matter in the
public sector, and specifically in the law enforcement department of the government. Un-
derstating the sources of the productivity gap in the police department will help identify the
drivers of efficiency in civil services like the police.
The results of this study are three fold. Firstly, the results delineate the individual con-
tributions of workers and managers to the productivity of the police departments. Using the
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variance decomposition exercise (Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013; Andrews et al., 2008),
I find that managers individually account for 6% of the explained variation in productivity.
This result on manager “fixed effects” is comparable with the literature (Fenizia, 2019) that
estimates how much of the contribution of productivity in firms is explained by managerial
talent. I also find that the police station effect (the firm level fixed effect) is 6% which is sig-
nificantly smaller than the individual effect due to workers (57%). This significant difference
in police station effect (6%) and worker effect (57%) is reminiscent of the wage dispersion
literature (Abowd et al., 1999; Bonhomme et al., 2020), in which a large variation in earnings
across firms is found to come mostly from workers.
Secondly, using the three-sided estimator, I find that worker, firm, and manager hetero-
geneity is present and is an essential factor in determining productivity. There are substantial
complementarities between workers, managers, and establishments/police stations. My es-
timates are based on the number of manager classes M=2 and police station classes K=2.
Low-type workers are 57% more productive when matched with high-type managers and
more productive police stations rather than low-type managers and low-performing police
stations. High-type workers are 87% more productive when matched with high-type man-
agers and more productive police stations rather than low-type managers and less-productive
police stations. Thus the productivity of workers depends on which types of managers and
firms they are matched with. The fact that the gains from matching high-type workers (87%)
are higher than those of low-type workers is utilised to find the sorting rule that increases
the aggregate productivity in the police department. In the variance decomposition, the
part of the variation in productivity explained by the covariance of worker type with the
manager and the police station type is 10.3% and 10.6% respectively. This shows the preva-
lence of positive worker sorting in the police department productivity – workers in police
departments sort moderately towards high-productivity managers. Similar positive worker
sorting is reported in the literature (Bonhomme et al., 2020) on wage determination, where
high-wage workers tend to sort to firms that offer high wages (Bonhomme et al., 2019). This
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result reaffirms the presence of complementarity in organisations.
Thirdly, the results show evidence of the magnitude of misallocation of resources in
the police department. The previous result shows the presence of heterogeneity as well
as complementarities between workers, managers, and firms. The allocation of workers to
managers and police stations can increase police productivity depending upon the nature of
complementarities. I simulate various matching rules such as matching high type workers
with high type managers (positive assortative matching) or low type managers (negative
assortative matching). The counterfactual exercise allows me to conclude that if the current
sorting level is raised using the optimal matching rule (positive assortative matching), then
there is an 10 % increase in the aggregate productivity of the police department. Hence,
social planner can maximize aggregate productivity of the police department by following
the optimal worker reallocation strategy.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature.
First, it contributes to the literature that studies the worker and firm-specific effects on
wage or productivity using employee-employer matched data (Abowd et al., 1999; Bonhomme
et al., 2019; Card et al., 2013; Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2017). I add managers as an
additional source of heterogeneity and provide a computationally tractable model to estimate
the productivity distributions. I also add to the literature that studies the matching process
of workers and firms (Jackson, 2013; Finkelstein et al., 2016). In a three-sided model, I
study the match-specific complementarities that arise due to the interaction of workers with
different managers and firms (police station types).
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on how managers and management prac-
tice impact firm-related outcomes (Bloom et al., 2013; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Lazear
et al., 2015). Past research has shown that high-wage workers sort themselves to the firms
that offer higher wages (Abowd et al., 1999). However, there is limited research on match-
specific complementarities and the sorting patterns of worker-manager and managers-firms.
Recently, Fenizia (2019) and Adhvaryu et al. (2020) have shown that manager ability ex-
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plains some of the productivity gaps across heterogeneous establishments, but their results
are inconclusive on manager-firm complementarity. I add the non-linear match-specific ef-
fects of the manager on police performance and show that the manager indeed contributes
significantly to productivity. Managers contribution is significant in providing match-specific
complementarities with the workers.
Third, my work is also related to research that evaluates the performance of public
services (Best et al., 2017; Janke et al., 2019). The output measures for the government-
controlled public sector have been scarce, which has limited research into the productivity
of the government sector. This gap in research is large in developing countries, and I fill this
gap by providing a worker-level productivity measure in the Indian police department. I use
the time to clearance as a productivity measure to calculate police effectiveness (Council,
2004). My work also contributes to research that has studied the impact of civil servants on
the performance of public institutions (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Best et al., 2017; Rasul
and Rogger, 2017; Finan et al., 2017). I extend this literature by showing that the police
officers’ and their managers’ effects on the police’s performance is substantial, and present
results on match-specific interactions between worker, manager, and police station.
The measure of productivity I use in the paper is documented to be better than other
productivity measures in the literature like the clearance rate, crime incidence, and survey-
based police perception or performance indicators (Ostrom, 1973; Cook, 1979; Eeckhout
et al., 2010). My measure of time to charge sheet in Indian law enforcement agencies is used
to provide the empirical measure of productivity and also identify the sources of variation
of productivity across police stations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides relevant infor-
mation regarding the institutional context. Section 3 details the theoretical model which
establishes a framework for the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the identification of
the model. Section 6 documents the estimation of the parameters of my three-sided model.
Section 7 describes the data and Section 8 presents the estimates of the model. Section 9
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shows the results of counterfactual simulations done using worker reallocation. Section 10
presents the conclusion.
2 Background
2.1 Police structure in India
Police in India come under the state government’s purview, and each of the 28 states has its
own police force. The central government also has a small specialised unit primarily used to
assist the state police in investigating major events and to help state governments with tasks
such as intelligence gathering and research. The police force is responsible for maintaining
law and order by preventing and investigating crimes. Every state is divided into various
field units: zones, ranges, districts, sub-divisions or circles, police stations, and outposts for
effective policing (Mitra and Gupta, 2008). For instance, a state will comprise two or more
zones; each zone will comprise two or more ranges, and ranges will be sub-divided into the
other field units similarly. The critical field unit in this setup is the police station within a
district (Verma, 2010).
A police station is generally engaged with (i) registration of crimes, (ii) local patrolling,(iii)
investigations, (iv) handling of various law and order situations (e.g., demonstrations, strikes),
(v) intelligence collection, and (vi) ensuring safety and security in its jurisdiction (reference)
(Mitra and Gupta, 2008; Das and Verma, 1998). A police station is headed by a Station
Head Officer (SHO), generally of the rank of Inspector and occasionally of Sub-Inspector.
In the hierarchy of police, the manager of the police station is the SHO, and other police
workers assist him in the functioning of the police station. Junior police officers are of the
rank of sub-inspector, assistant sub-inspector, and constable. When a police officer investi-
gates a crime, he or she is called the Investigation Officer (IO) in the official documents. I
treat IOs as workers.
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2.2 Crime reporting and investigation
The main responsibiliy of the police is to investigate crimes. Crime reporting and investiga-
tion in India are well-established by the statutory, administrative, and judicial frameworks.
Victims of an offence or anyone on the victims’ behalf, including police officers, can file a
complaint. Generally, a First Information Report (FIR) is registered with the police station
under whose jurisdiction the geographic location of crime falls. The crimes covered under
the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPc) are documented 2 in a First Information Report (FIR)
(Bayley, 2015; Kumar and Kumar, 2015). An FIR is a crucial document as it sets the process
of criminal justice in motion. It is only after the FIR is registered in the police station that
the police can investigate the case. The FIR gets assigned to an Investigation Officer (IO)
who takes up the investigation and is supervised by the Station head Officer (SHO).
The investigation of crime has many possible steps including collecting evidence, identi-
fying suspects, recording statements of the accused, statements of witnesses, arrests, forensic
analysis, and gathering expert opinion if required (Mitra and Gupta, 2008; Bayley, 2015).
Criminal investigation requires skills, training, and other resources such as adequate foren-
sic capabilities and infrastructure. The ability of the police workers plays a crucial role in
criminal investigation. The quality of police officers may vary with their training, expertise,
and legal knowledge in the department. The manager of the police station, or SHO, plays
a vital role in supervising the police officers, as their input and direction can help speed up
the investigation (Lambert et al., 2015). High-quality managers can efficiently allocate re-
sources within a police station across multiple simultaneous investigations (Raghavan, 2003).
On completion of the investigation, the police submit the final report or charge sheet to a
magistrate. The submission of the charge sheet is another important step in a criminal inves-
tigation that leads to the start of a legal trial. Unsolved cases where police cannot identify
suspects are closed after the magistrate’s approval, and details are submitted as the final
2Non-serious crimes such as forgery, cheating, and defamation, which are categorised as non-cognisable




2.3 Time to submit final report/charge sheet as productivity mea-
sure
There is a long-standing debate in the literature about how to measure the productivity
and performance of individual police officers and police institutions (Ostrom, 1973; Verma
and Gavirneni, 2006; Cook, 1979). To measure police productivity, I use the time to clear
the crime as a productivity measure which is calculated as the difference between the final
report/charge-sheet submission date and crime registration (FIR) date. This time to clear
the crime measure is associated with police productivity as the probability of clearance of the
case falls over time. The “cold case” phenomenon in criminal investigations is widely seen as
an indication of poor police performance; therefore, time taken to complete the investigation
directly relates to the police performance (Regoeczi and Hubbard, 2018; Addington, 2008).
The time to file a charge sheet to the judicial magistrate also reflects the quality of the
investigation carried out by the Indian police (Iyer et al., 2012; Amaral et al., 2019). The
longer the police take to complete the investigation, the more time the accused has to
manipulate the evidence and even abscond from the law. The larger times to submit a
charge sheet are generally due to a longer time taken by police to record witness statements
(Law, 2015). The delay in recording statements can affect witnesses’ recollections of events
related to crime and the identities of the accused (Read and Connolly, 2017).
Another reason I use the time to submit the charge sheet as a productivity measure is
that a delay in charge sheet filing has consequences for criminal justice outcomes. The Law
Commission of India (2015) survey states that 55% of pending cases in courts are delayed at
the investigation stage due to the inordinate delays in filing of the charge sheets by the police.
The survey 3 reports that the time gap in charge sheet filing is the most prominent reason for
the delay in a criminal convictions. Low conviction rates in criminal cases are indicative of
3Law Commission of India (2015) survey; random sample size of 1630 responses
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poor performance of law enforcement agencies. India follows the adversarial system of legal
justice, where the onus of proof is generally on the state (prosecution) to prove a case against
the accused. Unless the allegation against the accused is proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
the accused is presumed to be innocent. Therefore, a delay in the investigations also leads to
more acquittals because the accused are more likely to get bail in such cases (Krishnan and
Kumar, 2010). Judges in India were asked the following question in the survey: “Does delay
in filing charge sheets adversely affect the prosecution of cases?”. 100% of the randomly
sampled judges answered yes (N=50) 4.
This measure of police productivity is related to the clearance rate, which has been
widely used in the literature to measure police effectiveness (Cook, 1979; Mastrobuoni, 2020).
The clearance rate is generally measured at the year-end cut-offs when crime statistics are
published. These clearance rates are frequently adjusted in the upcoming reports as crimes
occurring towards the year-end pose survival bias. This data adjustment causes the clearance
rate statistics to be unstable because the past clearance rate improves as time passes. I
use the time to charge sheet or time to solve the case as a stable measure of individual
productivity at the intensive margin, whereas the clearance rate is a time censored variable.
My measure of police effectiveness is also validated by Blanes Vidal and Kirchmaier (2018),
who show that police response time directly affects the crime clearance rate and time to
clearance.
Individual criminal cases can have characteristics, observed or not, that may determine
the difficulty of solving the case itself. In my analysis, I do not control for the individual
characteristics of crime. However, this may not bias the result because I control the location
or police station fixed effects. For example, some police stations would encounter certain
types of crime more with different difficulty levels in solving these crimes. By controlling the
location fixed effects, I control the composition of crime at the police station level. However,
this relies on the assumption that crime composition does not change at the police station
4Report of Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) on increasing acquittals in India, 2013
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level, which is likely to be satisfied because I rely on a short panel to estimate my results.
3 Model
I model the production in an economy where heterogeneity is three-sided and comes from
workers, managers, and firms. I assume that discrete classes can represent heterogeneity
(Bonhomme et al., 2019; Bonhomme and Manresa, 2015). The discrete nature of hetero-
geneity means that there are finite types or classes of workers, managers, and firms in the
economy.
Let us assume that there are N workers, H managers, and J firms in the economy. N
workers are indexed by i or i ∈ {1, ..., N}. H managers are indexed by h or h ∈ {1, ..., H}. J
firms or establishments are indexed by j or j ∈ {1, ..., J}. I assume workers are of L different
types and this type index of the i’th worker is represented by αi where αi ∈ {1, ..., L}. I
represent hit as the identifier of the manager with whome worker i is employed at time t.
I partition managers into M classes, which represents the heterogeneity across managers. I
denote m() as the mapping function which maps individual managers hit to their classes mit
or mit = m(hit) ∈ {1, ...,M}. The heterogeneity across firms or establishments is described
by the finite number of K partitions or classes. jit is the identifier of the establishment where
worker i is employed at time t. Individual firms are mapped to their classes kit using the
function k() which takes firm identity jit as the input or kit = k(jit) ∈ {1, ..., K}.
The latent classes mit of managers and the latent classes kit of firms are to be estimated,
and in section 6.1 I describe this dimension reduction method. Nonetheless, the model allows
the number of individual managers and firms to be equal to the number of classes or M = H
and K = J . The implication of allowing this is similar to equating the manager and firm
identifiers to the class membership indicators as mit = jit and kit = jit.
There are two time periods in the model. In time period t, the worker draws log pro-
ductivity from a distribution, that depends on the worker type αi, the worker’s manager
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class mit and the firm class kit where the worker is employed. The conditional cumulative
distribution function of log productivity can be represented as below.
Pr[Yit ≤ y|mit = m, kit = k, αi = α] = Fmkα(y)
Workers at the end of the time period t who remain with the same manager and firm class
is indicated by sit = 0, these are “stayers”. Workers can change either manager classes, firm
classes, or both. These are “movers”, end of period moves are represented by sit = 1 and
log-productivity in the next time period t + 1 is drawn from a distribution which depends
on the worker type αi, manager type mi,t+1 and firm type ki,t+1. Here, Yi,t+1 is drawn from
a distribution that depends on the parameters denoting worker state (αi,mi,t+1, ki,t+1) and
t time period productivity Yit. The probability that type α worker moves is not restricted
in the model, and I use assumptions 1 and 2 below to simplify its dependence on specific
worker states.
The following two assumptions are used in the model.
Assumption 1
A worker’s probability of moving (sit) and subsequent match with manager and firm
(mit+1, kit+1) are both independent of workers current period productivity Yit conditional on
the worker type (αi), current manager class (mit), firm class (kit) and previous moves (sit−1)
sit,mit+1, kit+1 ⊥⊥ Yit|mit, kit, αit, sit−1
Assumption 2
This assumption relates to the serial independence of productivity conditional on current
state. In time period t + 1 worker draws productivity Yit+1 that depends only on αi, mit+1
and kit+1 but not on its past productivity Yit, past worker states (mit, kit) and previous
worker moves sit−1
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Yit+1 ⊥⊥ Yit,mit, kit, sit−1|mit+1, kit+1, αit
I now discuss these assumptions, their prevalence in the literature, and their implications
for the model. The assumptions are related to models where the next period wage is deter-
mined only by the current state (static model of Bonhomme et al. (2019); Shimer (2005)).
This means that there is no historical dependence on worker productivity beyond their cur-
rent and t-1 period matches with managers and firms. Thus the model is also compatible
with the class of the models where the state variables are (α,mt, kt) (Delacroix and Shi,
2006). The productivity drawing process is similar to the first-order Markov chain process
where the current worker, manager, and firm matches break with some finite probability,
and the next state is reached through a stochastic process. The model assumes that there
is no human capital accumulation or on-the-job learning/training in a short period of time.
This no human capital accumulation is evident in the model as workers do not change types
in a short panel. My model adds managers as a third source of variation in the outcome
(productivity), and can be seen as an extension of the two-sided labour market models where
wages are the outcomes of the match between worker types and firm classes (Card et al.,
2013; Alvarez et al., 2018; Bonhomme et al., 2019; Lentz et al., 2020; Abowd et al., 1999).
In my institutional context, the assumption states that Investigation Officers (worker)
mobility is random, conditional on Station Head Officer (manager), police station, and time
fixed effects. The assumptions allow workers to sort themselves based on manager and police
station match specific productivity realizations. Thus sorting of workers does not violate the
identification assumption. There are particular scenarios where these exogenous mobility
assumptions will be violated. For example, workers whose productivity declines over time
are reallocated to managers or police stations who have not been performing well in the past.
There is less likelihood of this assumption being violated in my scenario because I work with
a short period that leaves less scope of Human-capital depletion or reduction in ability in
few years.
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Using the above model, I will recover the distributions of the joint production function
for different worker types and their match with a different manager and firm classes. I
would also focus on recovering the proportions of different worker types employed within
all manager and firm classes. These productivity distributions will be essential to identify
the complementarities in the production functions where heterogeneity is three-sided. Apart
from complementarities, the sorting patterns of workers will be recovered from data using
the worker proportions. The measure of complementarities and sorting will be used to
run counterfactual simulations to observe the role of heterogeneity in maximizing the total
productivity in the economy.
4 Identification
In this section, I use the model described in the previous section and apply assumptions 1
and 2 to show formal identification using the observable data. There are two time periods
in the model. In time period 2, worker of type α draws log productivity y1 from cumulative
distribution function Fmkα(y1) working with manager m and firm k. Similarly the cumulative
distribution function of log-productivity in period 2 is defined as F ′m′k′α(y2). In the case of
job mobility (sit = 1), either the manager, firm class is different (m 6= m′ or k 6= k′), or
the worker changes both manager and firm class (m 6= m′ and k 6= k′). I define pmm′,kk′(α)
as the probability distribution of the job movers of α types between different manager and
firm classes. So for moves between classes (m, k) to (m′, k′), the sum of probability across
worker types
∑L
α=1 pmm′,kk′(α) is equal to 1. πmk(α) is the distribution of α type workers in
manager class m and firm class k. I can write the distribution of job movers as
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Equation 1 for job movers is derived after applying the assumptions 1 and 2. Assumption
1 states that the first period log productivity Y1t does not depend on the next period manager
(mi2) and firm (ki2) classes for movers (sit = 1). The independence of Yi1 is conditional on the
current match specific state of type αi worker, manager (mi1) and firm ki1 class. Assumption
2, which relates to serial independence, makes productivity Yi2 at time period 2 independent
of the previous period productivity (Yi1) and worker’s state (mi1, ki1) in the previous time
period. This independence assumption is conditional on the worker’s match state (mi2, ki2)
after a job move si1 = 1. In contrast to additive model of productivity with fixed effects
(Card et al., 2013; Fenizia, 2019), equation 1 allows that job mobility of workers to be
endogenous in nature. Workers change job not only according to their own type, manager
classes and firm types but also due to complementarity associated with the match specific
realizations with managers and firms in current and future period.
I can also define the log-productivity in period 1 as below:




I want to identify the following parameters in the model: Productivity distributions
in both time periods: Fmkα(y1), F
′
m′k′α(y2). Transition probabilities: pmm′,kk′(α). Worker
proportions (sorting patters): πmk(α). I rely on Theorem 1 of (Bonhomme et al., 2019) that
shows the identification for a two-sided model of workers and firms. The identification of
the three-sided model follows the argument that managers and firms are defined as discrete
classes so the manager-firm class can be taken as a cartesian product. The replacement
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of firm classes with manager×firm classes only increase the dimensionality in the BLM’s
identification setup, and I perform the simulations in section 6 to test if I can recover the
three-sided model parameter estimates using my model.
5 Manager and firm classes identification
Identification in the previous section assumes that there are M classes of managers and K
classes of firms. This dimension reduction removes the limited mobility bias (Andrews et al.,
2008; Bonhomme et al., 2020), since by using finite numbers of classes, mobility of workers
is from one manager or firm class to another. Thus making the number of job movers within
the classes sufficiently large to avoid the small sample bias caused when job mobility within
the individual managers and firms are considered. In the model illustrated in section 4,
distribution of log-productivity of manager id h and firm id j does not depend on its identity
beyond its manager class m and firm class k. First period log productivity shown in equation
2 can be rewritten as equation 3 for manager h and firm j. In equation 3, the left hand
side depends only on the manager and firm classes which are obtained from the mapping
functions m = m(h) and k = k(j).




The aim is to identify the class membership of managers and firms from theirs individual
identifiers and productivity data. I first start with the intuition of identification to recover
the manager classes then using a similar identification strategy firm classes can be recovered.
For illustration , I assume that number of manager classes (M) = 2, the firm classes (K) = 2
and number of worker types (L) is also 2. This simplifies the graphical representation of the
distribution of productivity. Figure A.1 below shows the tree diagram of the distribution
represented in equation 3. There are different combinations of manager and worker classes
that a worker can work with. In the example where M=2 and K=2, these combinations
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are (m1, k1), (m1, k2), (m2, k1) and (m2, k2). Within each of these combinations, there are 2
types of workers α = 1 and α = 2 which draw productivity from match specific distribution
fmkα. Next, I combine worker and firm classes together. In my example, within manager
class 1 (m1), now there are four types of worker-firm classes namely k1α1, k1α2, k2α1 and
k2α2. In figure A.1, πm(kα) is the combined worker proportion in the manager class where
kα ∈ {k1α1, k1α2, k2α1 k2α2}. Thus equation 3 can be re-written as in equation 4 after
combining the firm and worker classes to K × L discrete classes.




It follows from equation 4 that the first period distribution of workers matched with manager
id h is identical to the distribution of its manager class m. Thus the recovery of manager
classes is essentially a classification problem where we classify the managers having similar
productivity distribution to the same class. My identification strategy is similar to the Bon-
homme et al. (2019) and Bonhomme and Manresa (2015), where firms classes are recovered
in a two sided model. The approach to recover the firm classes follows a similar methodol-
ogy, where I combine manager and worker types together. In our example above, within firm
class 1 (k1), there are four types of combined worker-manager types: m1α1, m1α2, m2α1 and
m2α2. I can rewrite equation 3 conditional only on the firm id j in equation 5 below, com-
bining the manager and worker classes to M × L classes. Equation 5 shows that firms who
are of same type have identical productivity distribution, Thus recovering the firm classes is
also a classification problem.






The estimation methodology of the model is divided into two steps in this section. Since the
productivity distribution in Section 4 is identified using the finite manager and firm classes,
I first estimate the class membership of managers and firms. The first step in Section 6.1
describes this dimension reduction methodology. Once I have classified the manager and
firms into distinct classes, then I estimate the model parameters in step 2, shown in Section
6.2.
6.1 Estimating manager and firm classes
I recover the manager and firm class using a clustering algorithm. I partition H managers into
M classes and J firm into K classes. This estimation strategy follows directly from equation
4 and 5. I start with recovering the managers class by solving the following equation: the













In the above equation, F̂h is the empirical CDF of log-productivity of manager h having
finite support and discretized into D grids. Hm(h) are CDFs of the manager classes. nh is
the number of workers employed under manager h. I partition the managers into M classes
having cdfs H1, ....Hk so that sum of the squared error within the cluster is minimized. I
weight this least square minimization problem with the number of workers in each cluster.
I minimize the equation using large number of partitions in an iterative algorithm following
Steinley (2006) and Bonhomme et al. (2019). The weighted k-means clustering algorithm
is widely used in literature (Bonhomme et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2019). The manager
classes computed using the above k-means clustering have workers working with different
firms, which is consistent with the equation 4 where I combine the worker and firm classes
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to (K × L).
I now recover the firm classes identified in equation 5 by combining the worker and
manager type employed within a firm to M ×L classes. I use a similar clustering algorithm












where F̂j is the empirical CDF of log productivity of firm h. nj is the number of workers
employed in a firm j. I minimize the within-cluster sum of squared error to partition the
firms to K classes having H1, ....HK cdfs. This methodology results in firm class clusters
having M × L types of latent worker classes according to equation 5.
Using equations 6 and 7, I estimate the firm and manager classes in the framework of
Bonhomme et al. (2019) but applied to the three-sided model having a manager and firm
classes. The methodology can be treated like a nested approach where I combine worker-firm
types to recover manager classes and worker-manager types to estimate the firm classes. One
of the advantages of this methodology is that the estimated firm and manager classes behave
like Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). When the number of firms and firm size both increase
to a sufficiently large number, then the estimated firm classes converge to population classes.
This result directly applies to equation 6 and 7, when number of managers and firms grows
or H →∞ and J →∞. Additionally, when worker per manager class is large nh →∞ and
firm size is large nj →∞, then model estimation done in the next section is not affected by
the error due to the classification step (recovery of manager and firm classes).
6.2 Estimation of model parameters
In the previous section, I estimated the manager and firm class membership. In other words,
I estimated m̂(h) and k̂(j), and can obtain the class m̂it and k̂it for each worker. I now
use these manager and firm classes in the second step to estimate the model parameters. I
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assume that there ar L types of workers in the model. These are L latent types of worker,
capturing unobserved heterogeneity from the worker side. In the model specification, I now
define the parametric vectors. Let fmkα(y1; θf ) be the first period earnings distribution for
worker type α employed with manager class m and firm class k. θf is the parameter vector
of the distribution. For example, if the distribution fmkα is Gaussian, then the parameter θf
contains the mean and standard deviation (µf , σf ). In the estimation, I will assume that the
distribution of log productivity is Gaussian. When matched with the manager and firm class,
every worker type has a different distribution, which implies that the Gaussian distribution
of productivity differs along the lines of parameter θf . f
′
m′k′α(y2; θf ′) is the productivity
distribution in the second period. For the job movers of type α who change their manager
and firm classes from (m, k) to (m′, k′), the worker-type proportion is pmm′,kk′(α; θp). θp is
the parameter vector in the probability distribution having the length equal to the number
of worker types L. Worker type proportions in the manager class m and firm class k are
πmk(α; θπ). θπ is again the parameter vector whose length is equal to L types of workers.
The inclusion of the two different distributions f and f ′ at consecutive time periods gives
the model flexibility of time interaction even in the short panel. Thus the productivity
distribution can vary across time and incorporates the “time fixed effects” from a Card et al.
(2013) type model. I use equation 1 to write the log-likelihood function of productivity for
job movers shown in equation 8 below. As previously explained in section 4, the distribution
of log productivity in both time periods are independent of each other conditional on the
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In equation 8 above, N is the number of job movers. I estimate θ̂p, θ̂f , θ̂f ′ by maximising
equation 8, and is equivalent to a mixture model representation where I do not observe the
latent class of the worker. Job moves from one state (m, k) to another state (m′, k′) happens
for al types (L) of workers. I use a modified Expectation Maximisation algorithm (Dempster
et al., 1977) to estimate the parameters. One of the drawbacks of the Expectation Algorithm
is that it has a slow convergence rate towards an optimal solution. I increase the convergence
rate by using the Conditional Expectation-Maximization (CEM) algorithm, which maximizes
conditional likelihood (Meng and Rubin, 1993; Lentz et al., 2020).
I estimate the proportion of workers in each manager class m and firm class k represented
by πmk(α; θπ). θπ is the parameter vector whose length equals the number of worker types








1{m̂i1 = m}1{k̂i1 = k} × ln
( L∑
α=1
πmk(α; θπ)fmkα(y1; θf )
)
(9)
I maximize the likelihood in equation 9 to estimate the parameter vector θπ for every man-
ager and firm class. Since I have already estimated the log productivity distribution fmkα(y)
in equation 8, the maximisation problem in equation 9 is solved by linear programming.
I now summarise the two-step estimation of the three-sided model of productivity. In
Step 1, I estimate the manager and firm classes using the classification algorithm. In Step
2, I use the manager and firm classes to estimate the parameter values for the productivity
distributions and worker proportions, and the transition matrix for the different types of
workers who change states. The two-step estimation approach described above is computa-
tionally tractable and combines the approach of the recent two-sided heterogeneity literature
(Bonhomme et al., 2019; Lentz et al., 2020), while adding a third layer of managers.
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6.3 Estimation using simulated data
I now democtrate the performance of the two-step three-sided estimator described above
using simulated data. I assume the number of manager classes M = 2, the number of firm
classes K = 2, and also the number of workers’ types L = 2. I then simulate data using
arbitrary parameter values from Gaussian distribution: θp, θπ, θf , and θf ′ . I also simulate
the manager and firm IDs from the discrete classes using random draws from a uniform
distribution where the mean is set to an 100 workers per manager and firm. I use this
simulated data as the input to my two step, three-sided estimator described in section 6.
To compare the means of estimated parameters to original values, I use the Monte Carlo
simulation technique. I find that my classification method can recover the true manager and
firm classes accurately as shown in appendix A (A.4 and A.5). I also find that the second
step of the estimation strategy in section 6.2 produces the productivity distribution and
worker proportions are close to “true” parameter values as shown in appendix A (Figure A.6
- Figure A.7).
The asymptotic properties of the estimator are presented using the Monte Carlo simu-
lation approach. In appendix A, I show the distribution of the parameters estimated using
randomly drawn data simulated using fixed model parameters. I show the asymptotic nor-
mality of the estimator by increasing the sample size, making the number of movers in the
data substantially large (Nm →∞).
Though the mathematical proof of the asymptotic normality of the estimator is not
provided formally, the intuition comes directly from past research (Bonhomme and Manresa,
2015; Bonhomme et al., 2019). I satisfy the assumptions used in the Bonhomme and Manresa
(2015) to show that asymptotic normality holds for my model. The first assumption in
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) states that mis-classification error in the estimated manager
and firm class should approach zero as the sample size grows. This assumption is likely to
be satisfied in my model because my estimation methodology for recovering manager and
firm classes is similar to a two-sided model where firm classes are recovered. The difference
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in my setting is primarily nested in nature, because I combine the worker types with firm
and manager classes to determine the individual classes. The second assumption states that
the properties of estimator in step 2 is like maximum likelihood estimator. This is also
true as increasing the degree of freedom by adding the manager classes does not alter the
properties of the maximum likelihood estimator (equation 8). Thus using the validity of
the two assumptions of Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) and Bonhomme et al. (2019), my
three-sided model satisfies the properties that characterize the estimator as asymptotically
normal, and the same is shown using Monte Carlo simulation in appendix A (Figure A.8).
7 Data
Crime reports data: I use data on First Information Reports (FIRs) for the state of
Haryana in India. Haryana is a state located in the northern part of India (Figure 2), and
the Haryana police department has 283 police stations sprawled across 44 thousand square
kilometres (Figure 3). I web scraped the individual FIRs for crimes reported between 2015
and 2018. The crime reports have detailed information such as the crime registration date,
the administrative district where the crime is registered, the name of the police station,
the crime occurrence date, and details of criminal codes applicable as per the Indian law.
Each FIR also contains the identity of the Investigation Officer or IO working in the police
station, who is responsible for solving the crime. FIR also records the name of the Station
Head Officer (SHO), who is the Investigation Officer’s (IO’s) manager. A sample FIR of the
police department is shown in figure 1. The figure highlights the data described above. I web
scraped 472,082 of these crime reports for analysis. I then converted the unstructured data
in these FIRs to machine-readable data using programmable text extraction techniques.
Productivity measure (time to submit a final report or charge sheet): The
Haryana Police Department also publishes the individual case-level final report or charge
sheet filing date. I construct the charge sheet data using another web scraping exercise. I
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Figure 1: Sample First Information Report (FIR) with highlighted data
then match all the crime reports using the unique FIR id to their outcome, i.e., the time to
submit the final report or charge sheet (Appendix A, Figure A.2) .
Worker-manager-establishment matched data set and job mobility: My method-
ology of matched data set construction of the three-sided model (worker-manager-firm) fol-
lows the approach extensively used in literature (Abowd et al., 2002; Bonhomme et al.,
2020) that uncovers worker and firm fixed effects using matched employee-employer data.
The case’s name and the unique employee id of both the Investigation officers (IO) and
their supervisors, i.e., the Station Head Officers (SHO) are observed in the FIR data. To
create the matched data set, I use the anonymised unique ids of the employees of the police
department. In a few reports where the employee id is missing or erroneous, I created syn-
thetic employee ids using the officer name. To draw the analogy from the three-sided model
described in Section 3 to the crime reports data of the police department, I consider the
investigation officer (IO) as the worker, the station head officer (SHO) as the manager, and
the police station as the establishment or firm. I infer the job mobility of an investigation
officer (IO) when he/she moves to different managers and police stations. Hence, from the
data, I can observe the job mobility patterns of workers across managers and police stations.
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Figure 2: Map showing India and the state of Haryana is shaded (red)
Figure 3: Location of police stations in Haryana shown as dots (black)
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Figure 4: Distribution of log productivity across police stations in Haryana
Note: Log productivity in the x-axis is the negative transformation of log(Time to chargesheet)
Figure 4 shows the distribution of log productivity of employees across police stations in
Haryana for the year 2017. There is a large dispersion visible in productivity across police
stations. The top decile police station is 2.75 times more productive than the bottom decile
police station. Productivity comparison of police is scarce in the past literature. Hence I use
the benchmark from firm-level log-productivity distribution from Syverson (2011). It reports
the within plant productivity gap of 2.9 in India, comparable to the police productivity gap
across police stations.
8 Results
I use the worker-manager-police station matched data set of all crime cases registered from
2015 to 2018. I follow the sample selection methodology described in Bonhomme et al. (2019),
Friedrich et al. (2019), and Fenizia (2019), which uses weekly wage data in employee-firm
matched data sets. Following Friedrich et al. (2019), in my analysis, I consider workers
who have worked for at least three months in a police station. I use at least three months
for a worker because I want to exclude the temporarily seconded employees. They are
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sometimes posted in a police station as a trainee or short-term replacement of a police
officer. Occasionally, the employee id column is entered manually, which might cause an
error in inferring the job mobility of workers and managers across police stations. In such
situations, I use the names of employees to avoid ambiguity in id matching. I track job
changes by capturing all state changes of a worker due to his or her matches with managers
and police stations. In addition to the model having different distributions of productivity of
workers for different periods, the inclusion of such higher frequency job mobility will also be
useful in incorporating time fixed effects (Lentz et al., 2020). I use the aggregated case-level
outcomes for each employee to derive the employee-level productivity measure. Employees
with higher charge sheet time are considered less productive.
I now estimate the model assuming the number of classes of managers as M = 2 and
classes of police stations as K = 2. Two factors guide this assumption of a finite number of
classes. The first one relates to past literature, which assumes that a small number of groups
can represent the substantial heterogeneity in the classes. For example, Bonhomme et al.
(2019) assume ten firm classes in the Swedish data and recently they have also assumed 10
classes in the research on the labour market in the USA and Italy (Bonhomme et al., 2020).
The substantial earnings difference across all classes (either manager or firm) is critical for
assuming the number of classes. The second criteria relates to the restriction posed by the
finite sample available for analysis. The research based on economy-wide employee-employer
matched data (Bonhomme et al., 2019) has a large sample size of 0.5 million workers in 42K
firms. Therefore, at an average of 140 workers per firm, Bonhomme et al. (2019) can choose
to have several firm classes equal to 10 and still have many workers present within each
class. The sample size of the police data I use is smaller when compared with economy-wide
administrative data used in previous research. The police department sample has 9581 police
officers (Investigation officers), 1007 managers (Station head officers) employed within 282
police stations. This amounts to around 9 workers per manager and 30 workers per police
station in my data.
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Figure 5: Estimates of the static model on police department data of Haryana. Estimates
of means of log-productivity, by worker type (IO), manager (SHO), and police station class.
I order the manager class (M = 2) and firm class (K=2) (on the x-axis) by mean log-
productivity. On the y-axis we report estimates of mean log-productivity for the L = 3
police officer/Investigation Officer types.
Note: Log productivity in the x-axis is the negative transformation of log(Time to chargesheet)
I estimate the manager and firm classes by weighted k-means clustering described in
Section 6.1. I estimate the model parameters using step 2, shown in Section 6.2. My estimates
are based on the number of manager classes M=2 and police station classes K=2. I use the
Gaussian finite mixture in equation 1 assuming the number of worker types L = 3. I estimate
the productivity distribution and proportion of job movers across managers and firms using
equation 8, and then I estimate the worker proportions using equation 9. As described in
Section 6.2, I estimate the finite mixture model using the ECM (Expectation Conditional
Maximisation) algorithm. A well-known problem associated with the ECM algorithm is that
it can converge at local maxima and consequently fail to reach global maxima (Wu, 1983).
To alleviate this concern, I estimate the parameters using multiple starting points using a
grid-based parameter search methodology (Biernacki et al., 2003). I then choose the result
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(global maxima) that has the maximum likelihood among the converged solutions.
The results of mean worker productivity are presented in Figure 5. The estimation
results show the mean log-productivity of workers when matched with low type managers
(m=1) and high type managers (m=2) separately. Within the manager classes, police station
classes are shown ordered by productivity. So police station class (k=1) shown on the x-
axis has lower productivity than the class k=2. In both panels in the Figure 5, I show the
mean log productivity of the 3 types of workers in each type of police station class. The
difference in log productivity (Figure 5) among different worker types across the manager and
police station classes shows the worker-manager-police station heterogeneity. The estimates
indicate the complementarities between worker, manager, and police station types, as the
mean productivity of the same worker type plotted across police station types is not parallel.
There is growth in the productivity of high-type workers when matched with the high-type
police station and manager. For example, suppose I match the high type worker (α = 3)
to a highly productive manager and police station. In that case, there is a 40% benefit
in doing so when compared with matching the lower type worker (α = 1) to the highly
productive manager and police station. Thus, the match-related complementarities are large
in magnitude, suggesting that workers can gain immensely by matching with the right type
of manager and police station.
I also present the estimates of παmk or the proportions of workers in the manager and
police-station classes. Figure 6 represents the worker proportions. I show worker proportions
within low productivity managers (m = 1) in the left figure, whereas in the right figure, they
are for high productive managers (m=2). I observe that, within the less productive manager
class (m=1) and least productive police station (k=1), most of the workers are of the lowest
type α = 1. These figures also then, show the sorting pattern that exist in the police force.
The highest type worker proportion monotonically increases with the higher productive
classes, i.e., the positive sorting of workers to manager-firm classes. The proportion of high
type workers is 10% with the lowest manager type and firm class, whereas 70% of the workers
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Figure 6: Estimates of the proportions of worker types. Worker proportion in manager class
m =1 (left) and m=2 (right) across police station classes
have the highest manager and firm classes. This positive sorting of workers resembles what
has been found in the wage heterogeneity literature. The variation in log earnings is due to
sorting patterns, i.e., high-productivity firms employ high type workers disproportionately.
My model of three-sided heterogeneity reveals a large difference in worker productivity due
to the strong presence of complementarities that are not observed in the wage dispersion
literature.
8.1 Variance-Covariance decomposition of productivity
In this subsection, I propose a variance decomposition of the productivity. I extend the
methodology of Abowd et al. (1999), Card et al. (2013), and Fenizia (2019) to my model
where the heterogeneity comes from three sides. In my model, the variation in productivity
is explained by worker quality αi, manager mi, and firm heterogeneity ki. I follow the
Bonhomme et al. (2019) methodology, in which I perform the three-sided decomposition of
productivity by linearly projecting the log productivity on the worker, manager, and police
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station classes indicators, without interaction. The variance-covariance decomposition of the
linear model is given below.
Var(Yit) = Var(αi) + Var(mit) + Var(kit) + Var(εit)+
2Cov(αi,mit) + 2Cov(αi, kit) + 2Cov(mit, kit) (10)
where αi is employee type, mit is manager class and kit is police station class. Equation
10 decomposes the variance of log productivity into the variances of worker type effect α ,
manager class m, police station k, the combination of the covariances, and residual variation.
The results of the variance-covariance decomposition from equation 10 are shown in Table 1.
The worker productivity component explains 57% of the total variation. The worker share
is high and comparable to recent estimates of worker effects in wage dispersion (Bonhomme
et al., 2019; Lentz et al., 2020; Bagger et al., 2013; Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013).
Managers explain 6.2% of the productivity described in the three-sided model, and the effects
of the police station are similar (6.4%). Thus the effects of the manager on productivity are
comparable to firm-specific effects on productivity. In my estimation, the manager (Station
Head Officer) effect is in line with the literature discussing the role of management on firm
productivity (Fenizia, 2019; Lazear et al., 2015; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al.,
2013).
Table 1 also shows the share of productivity variation explained by the covariance be-
tween workers, managers, and police stations. The covariances explain 30% of productivity
variation. The correlation between the manager and police station is 72%, which shows a
high degree of sorting between the managers and police stations. The degree of correlation
between workers and managers is 27%, similar to the correlation between workers and police
stations. This moderate correlation between worker-manager and worker-police station types
shows the presence of positive sorting. Similar positive sorting of workers is reported in the
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2Cov(Worker, Police station) 10.6
2Cov(Manager, Police station) 9.1
Corr(Worker, Manager) 27.4
Corr(Worker, Police station) 27.9
Corr(Manager, Police station) 72.1
R squared 31.9
Notes: Linear regression Yit = αi +mit + kit + εit on the estimated values of
model
literature on wage determination, where high-wage workers tend to sort to firms that offer
high wages (Bagger et al., 2013; Card et al., 2013; Abowd et al., 1999; Lentz et al., 2020).
The presence of moderate sorting of workers will be important in the counterfactual exercise
shown in the next step. In the next section, I increase the degree of positive assortative
match of workers with managers and police stations.
9 Reallocating workers: Counterfactual simulations
I have estimated the underlying parameters of the productivity distribution in the previous
section. The estimation of equations 8 and 9 gives estimates of the underlying structural
parameters of the model described in Section 3. In this section, I execute a counterfactual
exercise to show that the changes in the matching pattern of workers with managers and
firms can increase aggregate productivity. I change the matching rule by reallocating workers
to different managers and police stations while keeping the number of workers and their
quality fixed. While performing the counterfactual exercise, I rely on the complementarity
of production shown in the estimates of mean log productivity in Figure 5. The constraint
on the number of workers of specific types within manager and police station classes is
taken from the estimates shown in Figure 6. I assume that the log productivity distribution
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remains identical when workers are matched with different classes of managers and police
stations/firms.
There are certain matching rules defined in the literature that provide optimal aggregate
productivity when the production function has complementarities between input factors.
Becker (1973), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) both states that positive assortative match-
ing is optimal when the production function or the match surplus exhibits supermodularity
(a strong form of positive complementarity). In the Indian police, productivity gains from
matching the high-quality worker with a highly productive manager are higher (87%) when
compared with matching a low-quality worker with a highly productive manager (57%). So
the optimal matching rule will be to pair high-type workers with high-type managers and
low-type workers with the less-productive manager (Topkis, 2011; Eeckhout and Kircher,
2011). On the contrary, if the complementarities are negative or the submodularity exists
in the production function, then the optimal matching rule should be negative assortative
matching.
I follow the following algorithm to vary the degree of assortative matching. I compute
the counterfactual worker proportion in each manager and firm type for two matching rules,
namely positive and negative assortative matching. In Figure A.3, worker proportions are
calculated using the pure positive assortative matching rule. I compute the counterfactual
proportions in Figure A.3 by rank ordering the worker, manager, and police station by
their types/classes and then allocating the workers to manager and police station classes
as per their rank. Similarly, counterfactual allocation of worker types πnammk (α) for negative
assortative matching is calculated. I then simulate the intermediate sorting patterns by
randomly allocating some workers within the manager and police station classes. To get a
sequence of multiple sorting patterns, I increase these randomly chosen worker proportions
iteratively (by 0.5% of the total worker population). The degree of positive assortative is
matching increasing in these sequences.
I use the simulated sequence of sorting patterns πcfmk(α) described above to generate the
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Figure 7: Haryana police department’s aggregate productivity (Y-axis) calculated using
multiple degrees (X-axis) of workers matching with managers and police stations.
Note: csort in x-axis is the simulated sorting pattern. Corner values represent the positive (+1)
and negative (-1) assortative matching rule
counterfactual productivity by using the parameter estimates from Section 6. Figure 7 shows
the counterfactual simulation results. The x-axis shows the simulated sorting pattern, which
I generated using the algorithm described above. In the x-axis, corner values represent the
positive (+1) and negative (-1) assortative matching rule. I estimate the benefit of reallo-
cating police officers by using the productivity distribution of all the simulated match rules
(x-axis) and find the optimal sorting pattern of workers that maximises total productivity
in the police department.
The results in Figure 7 show that the police department’s aggregate productivity increases
monotonically as the degree of workers matching with managers and police stations changes
from negative assortative to positive assortative. The supermodular nature of the production
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function in the three-sided case shows pure positive assortative matching as the optimal
solution. Table 2 shows the estimates of change in productivity between the original and
counterfactual states. Results show that the police department can increase productivity
by 9.2% by reallocating the workers using a positive assortative match rule, i.e. matching
high-quality workers with highly productive managers and police stations. I also compare
the counterfactual distribution of productivity with the current productivity distribution in
the police department. The optimal match leads to higher benefits in the top 90% percentile
of the productivity distribution. Table 2 shows that the 90% percentile receives a 30%
improvement in productivity. This is because the current allocation of high-quality workers
in the police department is sub-optimal in terms of matching. High gains can be achieved
by leveraging the strong complementarities between workers, managers, and police stations.
Table 2: Estimates of productivity at optimal matching rule
Reallocation exercise (×100)
Mean Median 10% quantile 90% quantile
Positive Assortative matching
9.2 6.7 -3.9 30.7
Differences in the means, quantiles of log productivity be-
tween two samples: counterfactual sample where workers
are reallocated optimally, and the original sample
10 Conclusion
In this paper, I decouple the effects of workers, managers, and firms on productivity and
show that heterogeneity matters. The worker, manager, and firm types heterogeneity are es-
sential determinants of productivity. The empirical analysis uses data from an Indian police
department. It shows that a manager’s contribution to productivity is significant, and a cen-
tral planner can increase productivity by leveraging the complementarities between worker
and manager-firm matching. Counterfactual simulation shows that if high-type workers are
matched to high-type managers and highly productive police stations, then aggregate produc-
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tivity of the police department can be increased by ten percent. This suggests misallocation
of resources within the police department.
Identifying the roles of workers, managers, firms, and their interaction relies on the job
moves observed in my micro-level data. The estimation methodology adopted in the paper
has the advantage of beingmore robust than linear fixed effects models, since it does not
have a functional assumption like additive and linear assumptions of the AKM’s fixed-effects
model. The model does not restrict the match-related complementarity arising from workers
placed with different types of managers and police stations. This methodology helps me
recover the structural estimates of the parameters that define heterogeneity in the production
function. Moreover, this methodology adopts an approach that classifies managers and firms
into discrete types, thereby circumventing the limited mobility bias issues debated in the
literature of two-sided heterogeneity.
This paper brings new insights into the productivity of public institutions like police
departments, which is difficult to measure, especially in developing countries like India. The
enormous productivity gap across the police stations arises from the underlying heterogene-
ity of workers, managers, and firms. This paper shows that similar to the private sector,
managers are relevant in police departments too. The significant manager effect helps to un-
derstand the functioning of public institutions from the perspective of managerial talent and
leadership. The results also reconcile the theoretical framework where complementarities in
production function can lead to different optimal matching rules. This study shows that the
optimal matching rule in the Indian police department is positive assortative matching. The
positive assortative matching rule is due to positive complementarity between worker and
the manager-firm match types.
The methodology adopted in this paper is general for scenarios when the outcome is
generated from a process where heterogeneity is three-sided. However, I use police depart-
ment productivity to show the presence of heterogeneity. Therefore, the empirical estimates
of the magnitude of misallocation can be extrapolated to police departments only. Future
37
research can adapt this methodology to specific sectors of the economy and the public sector
departments.
As previously discussed, this paper uses job mobility to identify misallocation of resources
in the public sector in India and also persistent productivity gap across locations. How this
persistent gap remains incentive-compatible in the public sector, remains an open question.
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A Figures
Figure A.1: Tree diagram of the distribution represented when together (No. of) manager
classes (M) = 2, firm classes (K) = 2 and worker types (L) = 2 (right). Tree diagram after
combining the firm classes and worker type (left)
Note: I combine firm and worker class from figure in right to figure in left. For example, within
manager class 1 (m1), now there are four types of worker-firm classes namely k1l1, k1l2, k2l1 and
k2l2.
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Figure A.2: Charge sheet date sample from Haryana Police department webpage
Figure A.3: Counterfactual allocation of workers using positive assortative matching
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Figure A.4: Simulated data: Manager classes estimated by combining firm and worker classes
together. (K × L or 2× 2)
Figure A.5: simulated data: recovering the manager classes (Low misclassification rate (less
than 1%))
47
Figure A.6: Estimates of Step 2 on simulated data : Model parameters - Bold(circles) lines
are true parameter values and dotted (triangles) are estimated values
Figure A.7: Simulated data: estimating model parameters: recovering πmk(α) : worker
proportions for manager class = 2
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Figure A.8: Asymptotic properties: Monte Carlo simulations
Figure A.9: Simulated data: estimating model parameters: recovering πmk(α) : worker
proportions for manager class = 1
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